US20070073617A1 - System and method for evaluation of money transfer patterns - Google Patents

System and method for evaluation of money transfer patterns Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US20070073617A1
US20070073617A1 US11/535,362 US53536206A US2007073617A1 US 20070073617 A1 US20070073617 A1 US 20070073617A1 US 53536206 A US53536206 A US 53536206A US 2007073617 A1 US2007073617 A1 US 2007073617A1
Authority
US
United States
Prior art keywords
money transfer
records
characteristic
value
money
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Abandoned
Application number
US11/535,362
Inventor
Seth Tolbert
Noel Brandt
Robert Bulkley
Robert Degen
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
First Data Corp
Western Union Co
Original Assignee
First Data Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by First Data Corp filed Critical First Data Corp
Priority to US11/535,362 priority Critical patent/US20070073617A1/en
Assigned to THE WESTERN UNION COMPANY reassignment THE WESTERN UNION COMPANY ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: TOLBERT, SETH, DEGEN, ROBERT, BRANDT, NOEL, BULKLEY, ROBERT A.
Publication of US20070073617A1 publication Critical patent/US20070073617A1/en
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

Links

Images

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401Transaction verification
    • G06Q20/4016Transaction verification involving fraud or risk level assessment in transaction processing
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/08Payment architectures
    • G06Q20/10Payment architectures specially adapted for electronic funds transfer [EFT] systems; specially adapted for home banking systems
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/403Solvency checks
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means

Definitions

  • Money transfers may be performed in a variety of ways, including, for example, by using the Internet, by using a phone to contact a service representative or an IVR system, by an in-person visit to a financial institution or money transfer location, and the like.
  • a sender may visit a money transfer location and fill out a money transfer application.
  • This application may request, among other things, the name of the sender, the name of the recipient, a pick-up location, the amount of money to be transferred, and depending on the amount, certain kinds of identifying data (such as sender's driver license number, social security number, and so forth).
  • This information is transmitted to a central database, and the money to be transferred is collected from the sender.
  • the recipient When ready to receive the money, the recipient may proceed to the pick-up location and provide the proper identification.
  • the database is accessed to confirm the recipient and to determine the amount of money to be paid to the recipient. After payment, the date and time of payment may also be transmitted to the database.
  • a method for evaluating electronic money transfers includes electronically storing records of money transfer requests, each record having a first data field representing a first characteristic of the money transfer request and a second data field representing a second characteristic of the money transfer request, sorting the money transfer records to create at least one data block where the records all have the same first characteristic (such as location), calculating a collective value for the second characteristic, comparing the collective value against a predetermined threshold value, indicating a potentially suspicious/irregular money transfer pattern if the collective value meets the threshold value, and analyzing individual records within the block for irregular money transfers if an irregular money transfer pattern has been indicated.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a money transfer system according to one embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 2 illustrates in greater detail the money transfer system of FIG. 1 .
  • FIG. 3 is a flow diagram illustrating a process for evaluating money transfer records in the system of FIGS. 1 and 2 .
  • FIG. 4 is a flow diagram illustrating steps within the process of FIG. 3 for evaluating blocks of records for suspicious patterns of money transfers.
  • FIG. 5 a illustrates an example of evaluating a block of money transfer records, using transaction value bands.
  • FIG. 5 b illustrates a second example of evaluating a block of money transfer records, using time-of-day data.
  • FIG. 6 is an example of one method for analyzing a block of records that has been identified as having a suspicious pattern of money transfers.
  • the embodiments provide systems and methods for using blocks of money transfer records in order to identify or indicate potentially suspicious or irregular money transfer patterns. If a block of money transfer records has a potentially irregular pattern, that block is then subjected to a more detailed analysis to determine if specific transfers within the block are likely to be criminal, fraudulent or otherwise improper.
  • money transfer patterns provide many useful features and advantages. For example, suspicious money transfer patterns not only alert a system operator of the need to investigate further for fraudulent or criminal activity, but also provide a basis for monitoring money transfer agents and their compliance with standards and policies for accepting money transfer requests.
  • the evaluation of money transfers may include several major sub processes.
  • the evaluation involves three sub processes: sorting the money records into predefined blocks of data, evaluating the blocks for suspicious patterns, and then analyzing any block having a suspicious pattern.
  • the blocks are sorted according to a first characteristic, which in disclosed embodiments relates to location.
  • the location may be associated with the country where the money transfer request was made, or the agent network that processed the money transfer request.
  • the blocks are then evaluated for patterns that indicate suspicious activity.
  • a money transfer system operator may periodically evaluate all money transfers being requested within a specific country, and those transfers have been sorted into a block of records in the first sub process (the sort may be done in a batch form, say at the end of each business day).
  • that block of records is evaluated for indicators of suspicious activities by collectively looking at one or more second characteristics of the records (different than the first characteristic).
  • the second characteristic may relate to something other than location, such as the volume of activity, the average transferred amount, the number of transfers that fall within a monetary range or band that might be suspicious (e.g., very large amounts, or very large numbers of smaller amounts), or the time of day that money transfers are made.
  • the number of transactions falling within certain ranges are counted.
  • the ranges may be selected to reflect regulatory requirements. For example, money transfers involving large amounts are required by authorities in some jurisdictions to be accompanied by additional sender identification (e.g., in the United States, two IDs plus a social security number or tax ID are required for transfers of $3000 or more, as opposed to only a single photo ID if the money transfer is below $3000).
  • a large count for transactions in a selected range e.g., just below $3000 (i.e., $2800-2999), may indicate attempts by senders to avoid compliance with such regulatory requirements.
  • a third sub process is used to analyze any block that has been indicated as having suspicious patterns.
  • This analysis could be manual (especially if the block is not large), but more likely would be computerized.
  • the analysis is done using the process described in the aforementioned application Ser. No. 10/091,000, by taking the block of records (having the suspicious pattern) and assigning reference designators for records that share certain similar or identical data fields. This analysis is particularly useful in the present invention, since the records are available electronically and have already been sorted into a block of interest (i.e., country, agent network, or other location).
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a money transfer system 100 comprised of an interface system 125 , an automated teller machine (ATM) system 145 , a deposit maintenance network 150 , a credit maintenance network 160 and a central exchange 170 .
  • Interface system 125 is communicably coupled to ATM system 145 via an ATM network 140 , deposit maintenance network 150 and credit maintenance network 160 .
  • ATM automated teller machine
  • interface system 125 unifies a variety of transfer systems while supporting a variety of mechanisms for introducing and receiving information to and/or from money transfer system 100 .
  • Interface system 125 comprises a transaction center 130 and one or more terminals 110 in communication via a terminal network 120 .
  • Terminal network 120 can be any communication network capable of transmitting and receiving information in relation to a transfer of value from one entity to another.
  • terminal network 120 can comprise a TCP/IP compliant virtual private network (VPN), the Internet, a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), a telephone network, a cellular telephone network, an optical network, a wireless network, or any other similar communication network.
  • VPN virtual private network
  • LAN local area network
  • WAN wide area network
  • telephone network a cellular telephone network
  • optical network a wireless network
  • Terminals 110 can be any terminal or location where value is accepted and/or provided in relation to money transfers across money transfer system 100 .
  • terminal 110 is at a money transfer agent location, such as a convenience store where a clerk can receive value from a sender and initiate transfer of the value to a receiver via money transfer system 100 . In such cases, the clerk can typically also provide transferred value to a receiver.
  • terminal 110 is an automated system for receiving value from a sender for transfer via money transfer system 100 and/or for providing value to a receiver that was transferred via money transfer system 100 .
  • terminal 110 can include a variety of interfaces.
  • terminal 110 can include a mechanism for receiving cash, credit cards, checks, debit cards, stored value cards and smart cards.
  • Such terminals may also be used at the payout end to print a check or money order, or to credit a cash card or stored value card. Examples of such terminals are described in U.S. Pat. No. 6,547,132 (U.S. application Ser. No. 09/634,901, entitled “POINT OF SALE PAYMENT SYSTEM,” filed Aug. 9, 2000 by Randy J. Templeton et al.), which is hereby incorporated by reference.
  • terminal 110 is a personal computer operated by a sender of value.
  • a terminal can be communicably coupled to transaction center 130 via the Internet.
  • the terminal can further include a web browser capable of receiving commands for effectuating transfer of value via money transfer system 100 .
  • Terminal identification information can be associated with each terminal 110 .
  • identification information includes, but is not limited to, a physical location, a telephone number, an agent identification number, a terminal identification number, a security alert status, an indication of the type of terminal, a serial number of a CPU, an IP address, the name of a clerk, and the like.
  • Terminals 110 may also be operated in agent networks, i.e. a plurality of terminals at different locations may operated by the same agent entity. There could many such agent networks within system 100 at locations around the world.
  • value can be transferred from any of a number of points.
  • value can be transferred from terminal 110 to itself or any other terminal 110 , from any terminal 110 to a deposit account via deposit maintenance network 150 or credit maintenance network 160 , from any terminal 110 to any ATM 114 via ATM network 140 .
  • Many other transfers to/from ATMs 114 , deposit accounts, terminals, and/or credit accounts can be accomplished using money transfer system 100 .
  • the ATM system 145 is only illustrative, it being understood that such a system is merely one of many possible optional means for money to be conveniently transferred/received without the use of conventional, agent-operated money transfer terminals, and the transfer of money within system 100 may or may not involve the use of ATMs 114 .
  • a fraud watch system 210 is provided in communication with transaction center 130 of money transfer system 100 .
  • transaction center 130 includes a network processor 132 to process data received and transmitted via terminal network 120 .
  • Data to/from network processor 132 is available to a host 133 that may communicate with one or more of a value translator 135 , a transaction database 136 , a settlement engine 137 and a messaging engine 138 to perform functions associated with transferring value via money transfer system 100 .
  • messaging engine may communicate with a message translator 139 .
  • the data received and/or provided by transaction center 130 may include information on the sender, information on the recipient, identification information associated with the sender (e.g., type of ID presented, driver's license number, etc.) or with the terminal 110 (terminal ID number), the type and amount of value transferred, a desired location to transfer the value, and the like.
  • a value translator 135 may be used to change the type of value. For example, value translator 135 may do a foreign currency conversion, or may transfer from one type of value to another, e.g. frequent flyer miles to United States Dollars. All information that is processed may conveniently be stored in transaction database 136 .
  • Settlement engine 137 may be used to facilitate the crediting and debiting of various accounts during a transfer. For example, if a sender requests that funds from a credit card account be used in the transfer, settlement engine 137 is used to contact credit maintenance network 160 to charge the card and to manage the fees involved in the transaction. Such fees may be those charged by the credit organization as well as internal fees that are a part of the money transfer transaction. Settlement engine 137 may be used in a similar manner when crediting or debiting checking accounts, stored value accounts, customer loyalty (e.g., frequent flyer) accounts and the like.
  • the sender may also wish to send a message with the value.
  • a message may be a simple greeting, business or legal terms, and the like.
  • Messaging engine 138 is employed to convert the message to the proper format depending on the type of output device that is to be used with receiving the money.
  • the output device may be a printer that physically prints the message onto some type of media.
  • the message may be temporarily displayed on a display screen, such as on a kiosk, ATM machine, point of sale device, an e-mail, a web page or the like.
  • the sender or recipient may also indicate that the message needs to be translated to a different language.
  • message translator 139 may be used to translate the message into the other language. This may be accomplished by simply doing a word look up for each corresponding word in the other language. More complex language translation capabilities may also be used.
  • a switch 134 to the appropriate network as shown. This may be to ATM network 140 , deposit maintenance network 150 and/or credit maintenance network 160 to complete the transaction.
  • a monitoring or fraud watch system 210 includes a fraud processing server 220 and a watch database 230 .
  • Fraud watch system 210 is associated with transaction center 130 in a manner that allows for access to transaction database 136 . Such association can be provided by direct wired communication between transaction database 136 and fraud processing server 220 , by direct or network communication between transaction center 130 and fraud processing server 220 , or by any other mechanism that provides fraud watch system 210 with access to transaction database 136 .
  • fraud processing server 220 is communicably coupled to terminal network 120 and accesses transaction database 136 via network processor 132 and host 133 .
  • fraud processing server 220 is directly coupled to host 133 and accesses transaction database 136 via host 133 . It will be recognized by one of ordinary skill in the art that a number of other mechanisms exist within the scope of the present invention for providing access by fraud processing server 220 to transaction database 136 .
  • Fraud processing server 220 can be a microprocessor based device capable of retrieving data from transaction database 136 , searching and manipulating the data, maintaining a form of the data on watch database 230 , and providing access to data at database 230 . Such access to the data can include formatting the data and providing the data in an easily accessible form.
  • fraud processing computer is a single computer, such as a personal computer or a database server.
  • fraud processing server is a group of two or more computers.
  • fraud processing computer can include a central computer associated with one or more peripheral computers.
  • peripheral computers can be personal computers or portable devices, such as lap top computers and/or personal digital assistants.
  • fraud processing server 220 includes a SQL server, while in other embodiments, it includes an ORACLE server.
  • Fraud processing server 220 includes a computer readable medium capable of maintaining instructions executable to perform the functions associated with fraud processing server 220 .
  • the computer readable medium can be any device or system capable of maintaining data in a form accessible to fraud processing server 220 .
  • the computer readable medium can be a hard disk drive either integral to fraud processing server 220 or external to the server.
  • the computer readable medium can be a floppy disk or a CD-ROM apart from fraud processing server 220 and accessible by inserting into a drive (not shown) of fraud processing server 220 .
  • the computer readable medium can be a RAM integral to fraud processing server 220 and/or a microprocessor (not shown) within the server.
  • the computer readable medium can be a combination of the aforementioned alternatives, such as, a combination of a CD-ROM, a hard disk drive and RAM.
  • FIG. 3 an overall process is illustrated for completing money transfers and then evaluating money transfer records for suspicious money transfer patterns. Many of the steps in the process are controlled by fraud processing server 220 .
  • the storage of records for the evaluation may be at watch database 230 . This permits money transfer records to be evaluated separately from the money transfer operations performed at the transaction center 130 , thus improving performance and minimizing operational impact on the host 133 and transaction database 136 .
  • the operator of the money transfer system 100 receives a request at a terminal 110 (e.g., agent operated terminal) from a sender to make a money transfer (step 310 ).
  • the money transfer is completed (step 312 ), so that money may be picked up by the recipient (e.g., at a money transfer agent location as described earlier), and a record of the transfer stored at transaction database 136 (step 314 ).
  • the records are readied for evaluation by parsing and stripping the records of data that is deemed not useful in the evaluation (step 316 ). In one embodiment, transactions of $500 or less are removed from the records since smaller transactions may be deemed not likely involved in fraudulent or criminal activity. However it should be appreciated that the amount of data stripped from the records can be large, little or none, depending on the preferences of the system operator.
  • the parsed and stripped records are batched by host 133 and transaction database 136 , and then are transferred for storage and processing at the server 220 and database 230 (step 322 ). While parsing and stripping are illustrated as performed at host 133 (this could reduce the amount of data needing to be stored at watch database 230 ), it should be appreciated the entire money records from transaction database 136 could be transferred to server 220 and database 230 , with parsing and stripping steps then performed at server 220 after the transfer.
  • the records are then evaluated for indications of suspicious or irregular patterns (step 324 ), as will be described below in conjunction with FIG. 4 . If a suspicious pattern is indicated, those blocks of records having the suspicious patterns are identified or reported to the system operator (step 330 ) and subjected (step 332 ) to further analysis, e.g., at server 220 , to identify individual records that may be fraudulent, criminal, or otherwise improper (as will be described in conjunction with FIG. 6 ).
  • step 410 specific blocks of records stored at watch database 230 are retrieved and sorted by fraud processing server 220 for evaluation.
  • the blocks are formed so that all records within the block have a common characteristic useful for evaluation.
  • the characteristic is location related, i.e., the system operator chooses records for a specific country or for a specific agent network.
  • the money transfer records from a selected country may be large, so the block may be made smaller and more manageable by choosing all records for a country corridor (i.e., transfers from one selected country to a second selected country).
  • Other possible characteristics could be used to create each block for evaluation.
  • the system takes all records within each block and aggregates the data in selected fields of the records (to create collective value for each field), according to selected secondary categories or characteristics (step 412 ).
  • the system may look at each record in the selected block of records (Mexico) and check the field of each record for the transaction amount. A count is provided for the number of transactions falling into each of several transaction value bands for each agent within Mexico.
  • the server 220 compares the aggregated category/secondary characteristic data to predetermined red flag or threshold values, and provides a report (step 430 ) of any patterns that are potentially suspicious.
  • the report can also include a simultaneous comparison of the same data to previous periods (step 422 ). Comparisons to previous periods (e.g., previous week, previous month) are useful when the system 210 is being used to monitor agent networks for compliance with policies and procedures (increasingly irregular data patterns may indicate a need for compliance training, and improving data patterns may indicate the success of a recent compliance program).
  • the agent identifiers may each represent a single agent or represent a group of agents operating in a single agent network.
  • Agent 1 has a disproportionately large number (75) of transactions falling within the range of $2800-2900
  • Agent 4 has a disproportionate number (30) of very large transactions in excess of $10000.
  • the server 220 may be programmed to identify and report any agent having more than 50% of transactions in the $2800-2999 band (such as Agent 1 ), and any agent having more than 25% of transactions in the Over $10000 band (such as Agent 4 ).
  • the transactions of those agents can then be further evaluated for determining whether individual transactions within the block are likely to have resulted from improper activity (step 332 , FIG. 3 ).
  • FIG. 5 b Another example of evaluating a block of records is seen in FIG. 5 b , in this instance using time-of-day data collected at the time a money transfer is requested.
  • normal agent business hours e.g., 7 AM to 11 PM
  • outside normal business hours 11 PM to 7 AM
  • Agent 2 has an irregularly high number of outside normal business hour transfers (91), which may indicate, for example, use of the system by criminals to transfer money at times to avoid day time scrutiny, or failure of individual agents to record the proper, actual time of transfers.
  • the block of transfers can be further analyzed (e.g., using the process to be described with reference to FIG. 6 ), and either suspicious individual transactions identified, or the agent required to undergo compliance training as to the proper process for time stamping transactions.
  • these characteristics may be evaluated for all daily money transfers from the U.S. to each of several dozen other countries, including Nigeria.
  • a high ratio of payees to senders for transfers from the U.S. to Nigeria may indicate that large amounts of money are being distributed to Nigeria using many money transfers in smaller amounts, in an attempt to launder money.
  • the total number of transactions, total monetary amount of all transactions, or the total number of payees/recipients that exceed predetermined thresholds may represent an unexpectedly high level of activity by one agent, and hence a suspicious pattern.
  • the number of transactions (within one sending country) from each sending agent to each receiving agent might represent (if exceeding a predetermined threshold) a suspicious pattern, due to an attempt by a sending agent to steer transactions to a pick-up location or agent chosen or preferred by the sending agent, rather than chosen by the sender. Compliance training for the sending agent may be warranted.
  • the total number of transactions, the total monetary amount of all transactions, and the total number of payees may indicate a pattern of senders attempting to launder money by transferring large amounts of money to multiple payees/recipients.
  • sender's ID photo or no photo
  • social security number phone number
  • Any aggregation that exceeds a threshold may represent an irregular or suspicious pattern.
  • a large number of transactions using one social security number may indicate a suspicious pattern.
  • a high percentage of transactions (e.g., 80%) completed by one sending agent without photo IDs being presented by the sender may be a suspicious pattern and indicate compliance training for that agent is warranted.
  • a block of data has been identified as having potentially suspicious patterns
  • that block (or, if desired, a selected subset of the block) is then subject to further analysis at step 324 ( FIG. 3 ), to either identify individual transactions that are suspicious, or to determine that the patterns are harmless.
  • Many methods can be used to perform this further analysis.
  • the analysis could be manual, with a trained analyst reviewing records individually to find those that appear to be part of fraudulent or criminal activity.
  • the records in a suspicious block may be many thousand or more (since it may represent, for example, all transaction on a given day across an entire country), and so a process involving more automated steps can be used.
  • the process groups transfer records together that have identical (or nearly identical) data fields. For example, if a number of transfers have the same sender name, same recipient name, same recipient phone number, or other sender or recipient identifying data, they are collected and given a single reference designator. In some embodiments, depending on the number of the records under a single designator, the records can be further analyzed manually or further sorted or grouped by fraud processing server 220 to provide an analyst with specific transactions (e.g., under a single reference designator) that could be fraudulent.
  • a block of records i.e., a block having a suspicious pattern, such as the pattern in FIG. 5 a or FIG. 5 b
  • the fraud processing server 220 step 601 .
  • Each record is pulled from the block (step 606 ) and compared to records grouped in any existing reference designator (step 611 ). In other words, if records have already been analyzed and assigned a reference designator because of identical fields, the record in question is compared to the records in those existing designators for matches.
  • step 616 If there is a match (step 616 ) then the record in question is associated (step 621 ) with the matched record designator (i.e., the record is grouped or clustered with the other records already grouped together under a single reference designator), and a time stamp (indicating the time/date of the most recent transaction within the reference designator) is updated (step 626 ). If there is no match, then the record is given its own reference designator and a time stamp (steps 631 , 636 , 641 , 646 ), and is added to the list or set of reference designators for comparison to additional records, if any remain to be checked (step 651 ).
  • Each reference designator (cluster of money transfer records) can then be searched or analyzed (step 656 ) to identify specific sender names, specific recipient names or other identifying data associated with likely fraudulent or criminal activity. This final analysis can be done manually or may involved automated checking (using fraud processing server 220 ) of the common data fields in reference designator lists against known suspect user names or other identifiers.

Abstract

A system and method for evaluating records of money transfers for suspicious or irregular transaction patterns. A fraud processing server evaluates money transfer records by blocks, each block consisting of records having the same characteristic relating to location, such as the country where the transfer originates. A second characteristic of the records, such as value, sending agent, or time-of-day, is aggregated and compared to a threshold value. If the threshold value is met, the block of records is analyzed to identify individual records that are suspicious or irregular.

Description

    CROSS-REFERENCES TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
  • This application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/091,000, filed Mar. 4, 2002, entitled “Money Transfer Evaluation Systems And Methods,” the entire disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference.
  • BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
  • Electronic transactions, such as electronic money transfers, play an important role in today's economy. Money transfers may be performed in a variety of ways, including, for example, by using the Internet, by using a phone to contact a service representative or an IVR system, by an in-person visit to a financial institution or money transfer location, and the like. For example, to perform a money transfer transaction a sender may visit a money transfer location and fill out a money transfer application. This application may request, among other things, the name of the sender, the name of the recipient, a pick-up location, the amount of money to be transferred, and depending on the amount, certain kinds of identifying data (such as sender's driver license number, social security number, and so forth). This information is transmitted to a central database, and the money to be transferred is collected from the sender. When ready to receive the money, the recipient may proceed to the pick-up location and provide the proper identification. The database is accessed to confirm the recipient and to determine the amount of money to be paid to the recipient. After payment, the date and time of payment may also be transmitted to the database.
  • It has been reported that some have attempted to abuse money transfer systems, such as persons associated with organized crime, drug dealers, terrorist organizations and the like. Various procedures exist to curb such abuses. For example, the United States government has implemented laws and regulations with reporting and other requirements that aim to reduce the improper use of monetary transfer transactions. For example, in the United States current money transfer regulations require a sender provide a photo ID if a transaction is $1000 or more, and two IDs and a social security number if a transfer is $3000 or above. However, reporting requirements are well known to criminal elements, and are thus easily avoided by manipulating money transfer activities to avoid detection. In addition, regulatory reporting requirements may be useful in detecting suspicious individual transactions after they have been conducted, but are not useful to detect groups of transactions that individually are not suspicious, but taken as a whole may indicate patterns of transactions or activity that are suspicious or irregular.
  • BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
  • There is provided, in accordance with embodiments of the present invention, a network/system and method for detecting and evaluating suspicious or irregular patterns of money transfer transactions.
  • In one embodiment, a method for evaluating electronic money transfers includes electronically storing records of money transfer requests, each record having a first data field representing a first characteristic of the money transfer request and a second data field representing a second characteristic of the money transfer request, sorting the money transfer records to create at least one data block where the records all have the same first characteristic (such as location), calculating a collective value for the second characteristic, comparing the collective value against a predetermined threshold value, indicating a potentially suspicious/irregular money transfer pattern if the collective value meets the threshold value, and analyzing individual records within the block for irregular money transfers if an irregular money transfer pattern has been indicated.
  • A more complete understanding of the present invention may be derived by referring to the detailed description of the invention and to the claims, when considered in connection with the Figures.
  • BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
  • In the Figures, similar components and/or features may have the same reference label. Further, various components of the same type may be distinguished by following the reference label with a second label that distinguishes among the similar components. If only the first reference label is used in the specification, the description is applicable to any one of the similar components having the same first reference label irrespective of the second reference label.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a money transfer system according to one embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 2 illustrates in greater detail the money transfer system of FIG. 1.
  • FIG. 3 is a flow diagram illustrating a process for evaluating money transfer records in the system of FIGS. 1 and 2.
  • FIG. 4 is a flow diagram illustrating steps within the process of FIG. 3 for evaluating blocks of records for suspicious patterns of money transfers.
  • FIG. 5 a illustrates an example of evaluating a block of money transfer records, using transaction value bands.
  • FIG. 5 b illustrates a second example of evaluating a block of money transfer records, using time-of-day data.
  • FIG. 6 is an example of one method for analyzing a block of records that has been identified as having a suspicious pattern of money transfers.
  • DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
  • There are various embodiments and configurations for implementing the present invention. Generally, the embodiments provide systems and methods for using blocks of money transfer records in order to identify or indicate potentially suspicious or irregular money transfer patterns. If a block of money transfer records has a potentially irregular pattern, that block is then subjected to a more detailed analysis to determine if specific transfers within the block are likely to be criminal, fraudulent or otherwise improper.
  • The evaluation of money transfer patterns provides many useful features and advantages. For example, suspicious money transfer patterns not only alert a system operator of the need to investigate further for fraudulent or criminal activity, but also provide a basis for monitoring money transfer agents and their compliance with standards and policies for accepting money transfer requests.
  • The evaluation of money transfers may include several major sub processes. In some embodiments, the evaluation involves three sub processes: sorting the money records into predefined blocks of data, evaluating the blocks for suspicious patterns, and then analyzing any block having a suspicious pattern.
  • In the first sub process (sorting all money transfer records into one or more blocks), the blocks are sorted according to a first characteristic, which in disclosed embodiments relates to location. In specific examples, the location may be associated with the country where the money transfer request was made, or the agent network that processed the money transfer request.
  • In the second sub process, the blocks are then evaluated for patterns that indicate suspicious activity. For example, a money transfer system operator may periodically evaluate all money transfers being requested within a specific country, and those transfers have been sorted into a block of records in the first sub process (the sort may be done in a batch form, say at the end of each business day). Then, in the second sub process that block of records is evaluated for indicators of suspicious activities by collectively looking at one or more second characteristics of the records (different than the first characteristic). As examples, the second characteristic may relate to something other than location, such as the volume of activity, the average transferred amount, the number of transfers that fall within a monetary range or band that might be suspicious (e.g., very large amounts, or very large numbers of smaller amounts), or the time of day that money transfers are made.
  • In one specific example to be described below, the number of transactions falling within certain ranges are counted. The ranges may be selected to reflect regulatory requirements. For example, money transfers involving large amounts are required by authorities in some jurisdictions to be accompanied by additional sender identification (e.g., in the United States, two IDs plus a social security number or tax ID are required for transfers of $3000 or more, as opposed to only a single photo ID if the money transfer is below $3000). A large count for transactions in a selected range, e.g., just below $3000 (i.e., $2800-2999), may indicate attempts by senders to avoid compliance with such regulatory requirements. There are, of course, many possible characteristics/patterns that may be evaluated in each block (as will be described below).
  • Finally, a third sub process is used to analyze any block that has been indicated as having suspicious patterns. This analysis could be manual (especially if the block is not large), but more likely would be computerized. In one embodiment, the analysis is done using the process described in the aforementioned application Ser. No. 10/091,000, by taking the block of records (having the suspicious pattern) and assigning reference designators for records that share certain similar or identical data fields. This analysis is particularly useful in the present invention, since the records are available electronically and have already been sorted into a block of interest (i.e., country, agent network, or other location).
  • Turning now to the drawings, FIG. 1 illustrates a money transfer system 100 comprised of an interface system 125, an automated teller machine (ATM) system 145, a deposit maintenance network 150, a credit maintenance network 160 and a central exchange 170. Interface system 125 is communicably coupled to ATM system 145 via an ATM network 140, deposit maintenance network 150 and credit maintenance network 160. In general, interface system 125 unifies a variety of transfer systems while supporting a variety of mechanisms for introducing and receiving information to and/or from money transfer system 100.
  • Interface system 125 comprises a transaction center 130 and one or more terminals 110 in communication via a terminal network 120. Terminal network 120 can be any communication network capable of transmitting and receiving information in relation to a transfer of value from one entity to another. For example, terminal network 120 can comprise a TCP/IP compliant virtual private network (VPN), the Internet, a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), a telephone network, a cellular telephone network, an optical network, a wireless network, or any other similar communication network. In particular embodiments, terminal network 120 provides message based communications between terminals 110 and transaction center 130.
  • Terminals 110 can be any terminal or location where value is accepted and/or provided in relation to money transfers across money transfer system 100. Thus, in some instances, terminal 110 is at a money transfer agent location, such as a convenience store where a clerk can receive value from a sender and initiate transfer of the value to a receiver via money transfer system 100. In such cases, the clerk can typically also provide transferred value to a receiver.
  • In other instances, terminal 110 is an automated system for receiving value from a sender for transfer via money transfer system 100 and/or for providing value to a receiver that was transferred via money transfer system 100. To accommodate various different payment instruments and types, terminal 110 can include a variety of interfaces. For example, terminal 110 can include a mechanism for receiving cash, credit cards, checks, debit cards, stored value cards and smart cards. Such terminals may also be used at the payout end to print a check or money order, or to credit a cash card or stored value card. Examples of such terminals are described in U.S. Pat. No. 6,547,132 (U.S. application Ser. No. 09/634,901, entitled “POINT OF SALE PAYMENT SYSTEM,” filed Aug. 9, 2000 by Randy J. Templeton et al.), which is hereby incorporated by reference.
  • In yet other instances, terminal 110 is a personal computer operated by a sender of value. Such a terminal can be communicably coupled to transaction center 130 via the Internet. The terminal can further include a web browser capable of receiving commands for effectuating transfer of value via money transfer system 100.
  • Terminal identification information can be associated with each terminal 110. Such identification information includes, but is not limited to, a physical location, a telephone number, an agent identification number, a terminal identification number, a security alert status, an indication of the type of terminal, a serial number of a CPU, an IP address, the name of a clerk, and the like.
  • Terminals 110 may also be operated in agent networks, i.e. a plurality of terminals at different locations may operated by the same agent entity. There could many such agent networks within system 100 at locations around the world.
  • Using money transfer system 100, value can be transferred from any of a number of points. For example, value can be transferred from terminal 110 to itself or any other terminal 110, from any terminal 110 to a deposit account via deposit maintenance network 150 or credit maintenance network 160, from any terminal 110 to any ATM 114 via ATM network 140. Many other transfers to/from ATMs 114, deposit accounts, terminals, and/or credit accounts can be accomplished using money transfer system 100. The ATM system 145 is only illustrative, it being understood that such a system is merely one of many possible optional means for money to be conveniently transferred/received without the use of conventional, agent-operated money transfer terminals, and the transfer of money within system 100 may or may not involve the use of ATMs 114.
  • Referring to FIG. 2, a fraud watch system 210 is provided in communication with transaction center 130 of money transfer system 100. As illustrated, transaction center 130 includes a network processor 132 to process data received and transmitted via terminal network 120. Data to/from network processor 132 is available to a host 133 that may communicate with one or more of a value translator 135, a transaction database 136, a settlement engine 137 and a messaging engine 138 to perform functions associated with transferring value via money transfer system 100. In turn, messaging engine may communicate with a message translator 139. The data received and/or provided by transaction center 130 may include information on the sender, information on the recipient, identification information associated with the sender (e.g., type of ID presented, driver's license number, etc.) or with the terminal 110 (terminal ID number), the type and amount of value transferred, a desired location to transfer the value, and the like. In some cases, a value translator 135 may be used to change the type of value. For example, value translator 135 may do a foreign currency conversion, or may transfer from one type of value to another, e.g. frequent flyer miles to United States Dollars. All information that is processed may conveniently be stored in transaction database 136.
  • Settlement engine 137 may be used to facilitate the crediting and debiting of various accounts during a transfer. For example, if a sender requests that funds from a credit card account be used in the transfer, settlement engine 137 is used to contact credit maintenance network 160 to charge the card and to manage the fees involved in the transaction. Such fees may be those charged by the credit organization as well as internal fees that are a part of the money transfer transaction. Settlement engine 137 may be used in a similar manner when crediting or debiting checking accounts, stored value accounts, customer loyalty (e.g., frequent flyer) accounts and the like.
  • In some cases, the sender may also wish to send a message with the value. Such a message may be a simple greeting, business or legal terms, and the like. Messaging engine 138 is employed to convert the message to the proper format depending on the type of output device that is to be used with receiving the money. For example, the output device may be a printer that physically prints the message onto some type of media. Alternatively, the message may be temporarily displayed on a display screen, such as on a kiosk, ATM machine, point of sale device, an e-mail, a web page or the like. The sender or recipient may also indicate that the message needs to be translated to a different language. In such cases, message translator 139 may be used to translate the message into the other language. This may be accomplished by simply doing a word look up for each corresponding word in the other language. More complex language translation capabilities may also be used.
  • Once a value transfer is properly processed, data indicating the transfer is sent by a switch 134 to the appropriate network as shown. This may be to ATM network 140, deposit maintenance network 150 and/or credit maintenance network 160 to complete the transaction.
  • A monitoring or fraud watch system 210 includes a fraud processing server 220 and a watch database 230. Fraud watch system 210 is associated with transaction center 130 in a manner that allows for access to transaction database 136. Such association can be provided by direct wired communication between transaction database 136 and fraud processing server 220, by direct or network communication between transaction center 130 and fraud processing server 220, or by any other mechanism that provides fraud watch system 210 with access to transaction database 136. In one particular embodiment, fraud processing server 220 is communicably coupled to terminal network 120 and accesses transaction database 136 via network processor 132 and host 133. In another embodiment, fraud processing server 220 is directly coupled to host 133 and accesses transaction database 136 via host 133. It will be recognized by one of ordinary skill in the art that a number of other mechanisms exist within the scope of the present invention for providing access by fraud processing server 220 to transaction database 136.
  • Fraud processing server 220 can be a microprocessor based device capable of retrieving data from transaction database 136, searching and manipulating the data, maintaining a form of the data on watch database 230, and providing access to data at database 230. Such access to the data can include formatting the data and providing the data in an easily accessible form. In some embodiments, fraud processing computer is a single computer, such as a personal computer or a database server. In other embodiments, fraud processing server is a group of two or more computers. In such embodiments, fraud processing computer can include a central computer associated with one or more peripheral computers. Such peripheral computers can be personal computers or portable devices, such as lap top computers and/or personal digital assistants. In a particular embodiment, fraud processing server 220 includes a SQL server, while in other embodiments, it includes an ORACLE server.
  • Fraud processing server 220 includes a computer readable medium capable of maintaining instructions executable to perform the functions associated with fraud processing server 220. The computer readable medium can be any device or system capable of maintaining data in a form accessible to fraud processing server 220. For example, the computer readable medium can be a hard disk drive either integral to fraud processing server 220 or external to the server. Alternatively, the computer readable medium can be a floppy disk or a CD-ROM apart from fraud processing server 220 and accessible by inserting into a drive (not shown) of fraud processing server 220. In yet other alternatives, the computer readable medium can be a RAM integral to fraud processing server 220 and/or a microprocessor (not shown) within the server. One of ordinary skill in the art will recognize many other possibilities for implementing the computer readable medium. For example, the computer readable medium can be a combination of the aforementioned alternatives, such as, a combination of a CD-ROM, a hard disk drive and RAM.
  • Referring to FIG. 3, an overall process is illustrated for completing money transfers and then evaluating money transfer records for suspicious money transfer patterns. Many of the steps in the process are controlled by fraud processing server 220. In addition, the storage of records for the evaluation may be at watch database 230. This permits money transfer records to be evaluated separately from the money transfer operations performed at the transaction center 130, thus improving performance and minimizing operational impact on the host 133 and transaction database 136.
  • As illustrated in FIG. 3, the operator of the money transfer system 100 receives a request at a terminal 110 (e.g., agent operated terminal) from a sender to make a money transfer (step 310). The money transfer is completed (step 312), so that money may be picked up by the recipient (e.g., at a money transfer agent location as described earlier), and a record of the transfer stored at transaction database 136 (step 314). At predetermined intervals (e.g., at the end of each business day so as to minimize impact on actual money transfer operations), the records are readied for evaluation by parsing and stripping the records of data that is deemed not useful in the evaluation (step 316). In one embodiment, transactions of $500 or less are removed from the records since smaller transactions may be deemed not likely involved in fraudulent or criminal activity. However it should be appreciated that the amount of data stripped from the records can be large, little or none, depending on the preferences of the system operator.
  • At step 320, the parsed and stripped records are batched by host 133 and transaction database 136, and then are transferred for storage and processing at the server 220 and database 230 (step 322). While parsing and stripping are illustrated as performed at host 133 (this could reduce the amount of data needing to be stored at watch database 230), it should be appreciated the entire money records from transaction database 136 could be transferred to server 220 and database 230, with parsing and stripping steps then performed at server 220 after the transfer.
  • The records are then evaluated for indications of suspicious or irregular patterns (step 324), as will be described below in conjunction with FIG. 4. If a suspicious pattern is indicated, those blocks of records having the suspicious patterns are identified or reported to the system operator (step 330) and subjected (step 332) to further analysis, e.g., at server 220, to identify individual records that may be fraudulent, criminal, or otherwise improper (as will be described in conjunction with FIG. 6).
  • Referring to FIG. 4, one embodiment is illustrated for carrying out the identification of suspicious money transfer patterns (collectively referred to above as step 324 in FIG. 3). As seen, at step 410 specific blocks of records stored at watch database 230 are retrieved and sorted by fraud processing server 220 for evaluation. The blocks are formed so that all records within the block have a common characteristic useful for evaluation. In the embodiment of FIG. 4, the characteristic is location related, i.e., the system operator chooses records for a specific country or for a specific agent network. In some cases, the money transfer records from a selected country may be large, so the block may be made smaller and more manageable by choosing all records for a country corridor (i.e., transfers from one selected country to a second selected country). Other possible characteristics (location related or otherwise) could be used to create each block for evaluation.
  • Next, the system takes all records within each block and aggregates the data in selected fields of the records (to create collective value for each field), according to selected secondary categories or characteristics (step 412). As one example (to be described later in conjunction with FIG. 5 a), the system may look at each record in the selected block of records (Mexico) and check the field of each record for the transaction amount. A count is provided for the number of transactions falling into each of several transaction value bands for each agent within Mexico.
  • At step 420, the server 220 compares the aggregated category/secondary characteristic data to predetermined red flag or threshold values, and provides a report (step 430) of any patterns that are potentially suspicious. The report can also include a simultaneous comparison of the same data to previous periods (step 422). Comparisons to previous periods (e.g., previous week, previous month) are useful when the system 210 is being used to monitor agent networks for compliance with policies and procedures (increasingly irregular data patterns may indicate a need for compliance training, and improving data patterns may indicate the success of a recent compliance program).
  • Referring to FIG. 5 a, the money transfers made at various agent locations for one data block (Mexico) are shown. The agent identifiers (Agent 1, Agent 2, etc.) may each represent a single agent or represent a group of agents operating in a single agent network. As can be seen, Agent 1 has a disproportionately large number (75) of transactions falling within the range of $2800-2900, and Agent 4 has a disproportionate number (30) of very large transactions in excess of $10000. At step 420, the server 220 may be programmed to identify and report any agent having more than 50% of transactions in the $2800-2999 band (such as Agent 1), and any agent having more than 25% of transactions in the Over $10000 band (such as Agent 4). In view of the suspicious patterns, the transactions of those agents (or the entire block) can then be further evaluated for determining whether individual transactions within the block are likely to have resulted from improper activity (step 332, FIG. 3).
  • Another example of evaluating a block of records is seen in FIG. 5 b, in this instance using time-of-day data collected at the time a money transfer is requested. As seen, for all agents in Mexico on a given date, those money transfer requests made both within normal agent business hours (e.g., 7 AM to 11 PM) and outside normal business hours (11 PM to 7 AM) are reported. As can be seen, Agent 2 has an irregularly high number of outside normal business hour transfers (91), which may indicate, for example, use of the system by criminals to transfer money at times to avoid day time scrutiny, or failure of individual agents to record the proper, actual time of transfers. The block of transfers can be further analyzed (e.g., using the process to be described with reference to FIG. 6), and either suspicious individual transactions identified, or the agent required to undergo compliance training as to the proper process for time stamping transactions.
  • As mentioned earlier, there are many possible characteristics that can be considered in aggregating data for suspicious patterns and comparison to red flags/thresholds. The following describes examples of such characteristics, it being understood that such description is not intended to be limiting:
  • Country Corridor Characteristics
  • For a given country, various characteristics of transactions to other countries can be evaluated, such as total number of transactions, total monetary amount of all transactions, the smallest and largest transactions, and the ratio of payees to senders. Past experience can lead to developing threshold values that represent an unusual level of activity. An aggregated value for any characteristic that exceeds the threshold represents a suspicious pattern.
  • As an example, these characteristics may be evaluated for all daily money transfers from the U.S. to each of several dozen other countries, including Nigeria. A high ratio of payees to senders for transfers from the U.S. to Nigeria (as compared to transfers from the U.S. to other countries) may indicate that large amounts of money are being distributed to Nigeria using many money transfers in smaller amounts, in an attempt to launder money.
  • Agent Characteristics
  • For each agent within one sending country, the total number of transactions, total monetary amount of all transactions, or the total number of payees/recipients that exceed predetermined thresholds may represent an unexpectedly high level of activity by one agent, and hence a suspicious pattern.
  • Agent to Agent Characteristics
  • The number of transactions (within one sending country) from each sending agent to each receiving agent might represent (if exceeding a predetermined threshold) a suspicious pattern, due to an attempt by a sending agent to steer transactions to a pick-up location or agent chosen or preferred by the sending agent, rather than chosen by the sender. Compliance training for the sending agent may be warranted.
  • Consumer Characteristics
  • For a given country, and for each sender, the total number of transactions, the total monetary amount of all transactions, and the total number of payees may indicate a pattern of senders attempting to launder money by transferring large amounts of money to multiple payees/recipients.
  • Biographical Characteristics
  • These characteristics include the nature of the sender's ID (photo or no photo), social security number, phone number, and so forth. Any aggregation that exceeds a threshold may represent an irregular or suspicious pattern. As an example, a large number of transactions using one social security number may indicate a suspicious pattern. As another example, a high percentage of transactions (e.g., 80%) completed by one sending agent without photo IDs being presented by the sender may be a suspicious pattern and indicate compliance training for that agent is warranted.
  • Once a block of data had been identified as having potentially suspicious patterns, that block (or, if desired, a selected subset of the block) is then subject to further analysis at step 324 (FIG. 3), to either identify individual transactions that are suspicious, or to determine that the patterns are harmless. Many methods can be used to perform this further analysis. For example, the analysis could be manual, with a trained analyst reviewing records individually to find those that appear to be part of fraudulent or criminal activity. However, in most cases, the records in a suspicious block may be many thousand or more (since it may represent, for example, all transaction on a given day across an entire country), and so a process involving more automated steps can be used.
  • One such process for analyzing individual records in shown in FIG. 6, and is described also in aforementioned application Ser. No. 10/091,000. Basically, the process groups transfer records together that have identical (or nearly identical) data fields. For example, if a number of transfers have the same sender name, same recipient name, same recipient phone number, or other sender or recipient identifying data, they are collected and given a single reference designator. In some embodiments, depending on the number of the records under a single designator, the records can be further analyzed manually or further sorted or grouped by fraud processing server 220 to provide an analyst with specific transactions (e.g., under a single reference designator) that could be fraudulent.
  • This is illustrated in FIG. 6, where a block of records (i.e., a block having a suspicious pattern, such as the pattern in FIG. 5 aor FIG. 5 b) is provided to the fraud processing server 220 (step 601). Each record is pulled from the block (step 606) and compared to records grouped in any existing reference designator (step 611). In other words, if records have already been analyzed and assigned a reference designator because of identical fields, the record in question is compared to the records in those existing designators for matches. If there is a match (step 616) then the record in question is associated (step 621) with the matched record designator (i.e., the record is grouped or clustered with the other records already grouped together under a single reference designator), and a time stamp (indicating the time/date of the most recent transaction within the reference designator) is updated (step 626). If there is no match, then the record is given its own reference designator and a time stamp ( steps 631, 636, 641, 646), and is added to the list or set of reference designators for comparison to additional records, if any remain to be checked (step 651).
  • Each reference designator (cluster of money transfer records) can then be searched or analyzed (step 656) to identify specific sender names, specific recipient names or other identifying data associated with likely fraudulent or criminal activity. This final analysis can be done manually or may involved automated checking (using fraud processing server 220) of the common data fields in reference designator lists against known suspect user names or other identifiers.
  • As should be apparent, methods other than that described above are available for analyzing blocks of records having suspicious patterns, as represented by step 324 in FIG. 3. For example, an analysis method could be used as described in U.S. application Ser. No. 10/434,409, entitled “SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR GRADUATED SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY DETECTION,” filed May 7, 2003 by Robert G. Degen et al., which is hereby incorporated by reference. Under such analysis method, transactions are grouped according to affinities between transactions (e.g., common data points, such as sender names), and with increasing levels of scrutiny in order isolate suspect money transfers.
  • While a detailed description of presently preferred embodiments of the invention has been given above, various alternatives, modifications, and equivalents will be apparent to those skilled in the art without varying from the spirit of the invention.
  • Therefore, the above description should not be taken as limiting the scope of the invention, which is defined by the appended claims.

Claims (23)

1. A method for evaluating electronic money transfers, comprising:
electronically storing records of money transfer requests, wherein each record is associated with a money transfer request and has at least two data fields, a first data field representing a first characteristic of the money transfer request and a second data field representing a second characteristic of the money transfer request;
sorting the money transfer records to create at least one data block, wherein all records in the data block have the same first characteristic;
calculating a collective value of the second characteristic of all the records in the data block;
comparing the collective value against a predetermined threshold value, threshold value chosen to represent potentially irregular money transfer transactions;
indicating a potentially irregular money transfer pattern if the collective value meets the threshold value; and
analyzing individual records within the block for irregular money transfers if an irregular money transfer pattern has been indicated.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the first characteristic is related to the location of the money transfer request.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the first characteristic is the country where the money transfer request in made.
4. The method of claim 2, wherein the first characteristic is the agent network receiving the money transfer request.
5. The method of claim 2, wherein the second characteristic is related to the value of the money transfer request.
6. The method of claim 5, wherein the value of each money transfer request is assigned to one of a plurality of value bands, each band representing a predetermined range of transferred monetary amounts, and wherein the collective value represents the number of money transfer requests having transferred monetary amounts falling within one of the value bands.
7. The method of claim 6, wherein predetermined range has an upper limit below $3000.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein predetermined range has a lower limit above $2800.
9. The method of claim 2, wherein the second characteristic is related to the time-of-day of each transaction.
10. The method of claim 9, wherein the second characteristic is related to whether the transaction is during normal business hours or outside normal business hours, wherein the collective value is the total number of transactions outside normal business hours, and wherein the threshold value is a percentage of the transactions outside normal business hours in relation to the total number of transactions.
11. The method of claim 10, wherein the comparing step compares, for each of a plurality of agents, the collective value of the total number of transactions outside normal business hours to the threshold value.
12. The method of claim 2, wherein the second characteristic is chosen from a group consisting of:
transaction value band characteristics;
country corridor characteristics;
agent characteristics;
agent to agent characteristics;
consumer characteristics; and
biographical characteristics.
13. The method of claim 1, wherein the electronic records are stored at a money transfer system, wherein the stored records are transferred to a monitoring system programmed for carrying out the steps of sorting the money transfer records, calculating a collective value for the second characteristic of all the records in the data block, comparing the collective value of the second characteristic against a predetermined threshold value, indicating a potentially irregular money transfer pattern if the collective value of the second characteristic of all records in the data block meets the threshold value, and analyzing individual records within the data bock for irregular money transfers, and wherein the threshold value is a red flag threshold selected by the operator of the money transfer system based on experience.
14. The method of claim 1, wherein the money transfer records include a first sender identification associated with a first money transfer request and at least a second sender identification associated with a second money transfer request, and wherein the step of analyzing individual records comprises:
performing an analysis of the records, wherein the analysis indicates the first sender identification and the second sender identification are related;
creating a reference designator, wherein the reference designator is associated with records having the related first and second sender identifications; and
searching the records associated with the reference designator to determine if any of records are suspicious money transfer requests.
15. The method of claim 14, wherein the step of searching includes searching the records to determine if any of the money transfer requests are by a known suspicious user.
16. A method for evaluating electronic money transfers, comprising:
receiving a plurality of money transfer requests;
electronically storing records of the money transfer requests, wherein each record is associated with one money transfer request and has data that defines characteristics of that money transfer request, including at least an location characteristic relating to the location where the money transfer request was made and a transaction characteristic relating to a characteristic other than location;
sorting the money transfer records into at least one block, wherein all records in the block have the same location characteristic;
aggregating the transaction characteristic of all the records in the block to arrive at a collective value for the transaction characteristic;
defining a red flag threshold level for the collective value, the threshold level chosen to represent, if met, a suspicious money transfer pattern;
comparing the collective value for the transactional characteristics with the threshold level;
indicating a suspicious money transfer pattern if the collective value for the transaction characteristic meets the threshold level; and
analyzing individual records within the block if a suspicious money transfer pattern has been indicated.
17. A system for evaluating money transfer records, comprising:
a database for storing a plurality money transfer records, each record having a plurality of data fields relating to the money transfer, including a first field relating to a characteristic of the location where the money transfer was requested and a second field relating to a transaction characteristic not related to location;
a fraud processing server for evaluating the money transfer records, the fraud processing server programmed to:
sort the money records into one or more blocks of records, each block having the same characteristic in the first field;
aggregate the data in the second field of the records in the block to obtain a collective value of the characteristics in the second field;
compare the collective value to a threshold value, wherein the threshold level is chosen to represent, if met, a suspicious money transfer pattern; and
indicating a suspicious money transfer pattern if the collective value meets the threshold value, so that the block of records can be further analyzed to identify suspicious individual money transfers.
18. The system of claim 17, wherein the characteristic in the first field identifies the country where the money transfer request in made.
19. The system of claim 17, wherein the characteristic in the first field identifies the agent network processing the money transfer request.
20. The system of claim 17, wherein the characteristic in the second field identifies the value of the money transfer request.
21. The system of claim 17, wherein the characteristic in the second field identifies the time-of-day of each transaction.
22. The system of claim 17, wherein the characteristic in the second field is chosen from a group consisting of:
transaction value band characteristics;
country corridor characteristics;
agent characteristics;
agent to agent characteristics;
consumer characteristics; and
biographical characteristics.
23. The system of claim 17, wherein the database is a fraud watch database, wherein records are collected and stored by a host computer and an associated transaction database within an money transfer system in response to money transfer requests by senders of money transfers, and wherein the fraud watch database and fraud processing server are separate from the host computer and transaction database, in order to minimize operational impact on the host computer and transaction database.
US11/535,362 2002-03-04 2006-09-26 System and method for evaluation of money transfer patterns Abandoned US20070073617A1 (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US11/535,362 US20070073617A1 (en) 2002-03-04 2006-09-26 System and method for evaluation of money transfer patterns

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US10/091,000 US8412633B2 (en) 2002-03-04 2002-03-04 Money transfer evaluation systems and methods
US11/535,362 US20070073617A1 (en) 2002-03-04 2006-09-26 System and method for evaluation of money transfer patterns

Related Parent Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US10/091,000 Continuation-In-Part US8412633B2 (en) 2001-09-07 2002-03-04 Money transfer evaluation systems and methods

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20070073617A1 true US20070073617A1 (en) 2007-03-29

Family

ID=27804085

Family Applications (4)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US10/091,000 Active 2029-03-18 US8412633B2 (en) 2001-09-07 2002-03-04 Money transfer evaluation systems and methods
US10/434,409 Active 2029-03-15 US8417600B2 (en) 2002-03-04 2003-05-07 Systems and methods for graduated suspicious activity detection
US11/535,362 Abandoned US20070073617A1 (en) 2002-03-04 2006-09-26 System and method for evaluation of money transfer patterns
US13/791,238 Abandoned US20130262297A1 (en) 2002-03-04 2013-03-08 Systems and methods for graduated suspicious activity detection

Family Applications Before (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US10/091,000 Active 2029-03-18 US8412633B2 (en) 2001-09-07 2002-03-04 Money transfer evaluation systems and methods
US10/434,409 Active 2029-03-15 US8417600B2 (en) 2002-03-04 2003-05-07 Systems and methods for graduated suspicious activity detection

Family Applications After (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US13/791,238 Abandoned US20130262297A1 (en) 2002-03-04 2013-03-08 Systems and methods for graduated suspicious activity detection

Country Status (3)

Country Link
US (4) US8412633B2 (en)
AU (1) AU2003223235A1 (en)
WO (1) WO2003077181A1 (en)

Cited By (12)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20090234764A1 (en) * 2008-03-14 2009-09-17 Mark Friesen Systems and methods for biometric authentication of monetary fund transfer
WO2009114020A1 (en) * 2008-03-14 2009-09-17 Sgl Network, Inc. Systems and methods for biometric authentication of monetary fund transfer
US20090287599A1 (en) * 2008-05-15 2009-11-19 Bank Of America Corporation Monetary Transfer Approval Via Mobile Device
US20100121701A1 (en) * 2008-11-13 2010-05-13 Loc Duc Nguyen System and method for uniquely identifying point of sale devices in an open payment network
US20130325720A1 (en) * 2007-10-18 2013-12-05 Moneygram International, Inc. Global compliance processing system for a money transfer system
US20140075508A1 (en) * 2007-06-22 2014-03-13 4Dk Technologies, Inc. Delegating or transferring of access to resources between multiple devices
US20140244497A1 (en) * 2012-05-08 2014-08-28 Vantiv, Llc Systems and Methods for Performing Funds Freeze and/or Funds Seizure with Respect to Prepaid Payment Cards
US9751006B2 (en) 2012-11-26 2017-09-05 Moneygram International, Inc. Promotion generation engine for a money transfer system
US10192204B2 (en) 2013-08-01 2019-01-29 Moneygram International, Inc. System and method for staging money transfers between users having profiles
US10402795B2 (en) 2012-01-05 2019-09-03 Moneygram International, Inc. Prefunding for money transfer send transactions
US10755245B2 (en) 2013-02-25 2020-08-25 Moneygram International, Inc. Money transfer system having location based language and dynamic receipt capabilities
US11900227B1 (en) 2022-07-25 2024-02-13 Gravystack, Inc. Apparatus for producing a financial target strategy and a method for its use

Families Citing this family (70)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7376587B1 (en) 2000-07-11 2008-05-20 Western Union Financial Services, Inc. Method for enabling transfer of funds through a computer network
WO2002005195A1 (en) 2000-07-11 2002-01-17 First Data Corporation Wide area network person-to-person payment
US7266533B2 (en) 2000-12-15 2007-09-04 The Western Union Company Electronic gift greeting
US8209246B2 (en) 2001-03-20 2012-06-26 Goldman, Sachs & Co. Proprietary risk management clearinghouse
US8140415B2 (en) 2001-03-20 2012-03-20 Goldman Sachs & Co. Automated global risk management
US8121937B2 (en) 2001-03-20 2012-02-21 Goldman Sachs & Co. Gaming industry risk management clearinghouse
US7184989B2 (en) 2001-03-31 2007-02-27 First Data Corporation Staged transactions systems and methods
US8150763B2 (en) 2001-03-31 2012-04-03 The Western Union Company Systems and methods for staging transactions, payments and collections
US9853759B1 (en) 2001-03-31 2017-12-26 First Data Corporation Staged transaction system for mobile commerce
US7117183B2 (en) 2001-03-31 2006-10-03 First Data Coroporation Airline ticket payment and reservation system and methods
US7096205B2 (en) 2001-03-31 2006-08-22 First Data Corporation Systems and methods for enrolling consumers in goods and services
US8412633B2 (en) * 2002-03-04 2013-04-02 The Western Union Company Money transfer evaluation systems and methods
US8244632B2 (en) 2001-10-26 2012-08-14 First Data Corporation Automated transfer with stored value
US8374962B2 (en) 2001-10-26 2013-02-12 First Data Corporation Stored value payouts
US20040128240A1 (en) * 2002-10-07 2004-07-01 Yusin Wendy E. Method and system for managing financial transactions
US7792716B2 (en) * 2002-10-31 2010-09-07 Federal Reserve Bank Of Atlanta Searching for and identifying automated clearing house transactions by transaction type
US7330835B2 (en) * 2002-10-31 2008-02-12 Federal Reserve Bank Of Minneapolis Method and system for tracking and reporting automated clearing house transaction status
US8032452B2 (en) * 2002-11-06 2011-10-04 The Western Union Company Multiple-entity transaction systems and methods
US8156040B2 (en) * 2003-07-03 2012-04-10 Federal Reserve Bank Of Minneapolis Method and system for conducting international electronic financial transactions
US8543477B2 (en) * 2003-09-30 2013-09-24 Federal Reserve Bank Of Atlanta Value tracking and reporting of automated clearing house transactions
US8417636B2 (en) * 2003-09-30 2013-04-09 Federal Reserve Bank Of Atlanta Approving ACH operator processing of ACH payments based on an originating depository financial institution's approved originator list
US20050222929A1 (en) * 2004-04-06 2005-10-06 Pricewaterhousecoopers Llp Systems and methods for investigation of financial reporting information
US20050222928A1 (en) * 2004-04-06 2005-10-06 Pricewaterhousecoopers Llp Systems and methods for investigation of financial reporting information
US8442953B2 (en) 2004-07-02 2013-05-14 Goldman, Sachs & Co. Method, system, apparatus, program code and means for determining a redundancy of information
US8996481B2 (en) 2004-07-02 2015-03-31 Goldman, Sach & Co. Method, system, apparatus, program code and means for identifying and extracting information
US8510300B2 (en) 2004-07-02 2013-08-13 Goldman, Sachs & Co. Systems and methods for managing information associated with legal, compliance and regulatory risk
US8762191B2 (en) 2004-07-02 2014-06-24 Goldman, Sachs & Co. Systems, methods, apparatus, and schema for storing, managing and retrieving information
US7881996B1 (en) 2004-08-03 2011-02-01 Federal Reserve Bank Of Atlanta Method and system for screening financial transactions
US20060047593A1 (en) * 2004-09-01 2006-03-02 Ubs Financial Services Inc. Method and system for funds management
US7580886B1 (en) * 2004-09-15 2009-08-25 Federal Reserve Bank Of Atlanta Managing foreign payments in an international ACH
US8152054B2 (en) 2004-10-19 2012-04-10 The Western Union Company Money transfer systems and methods
US7392940B2 (en) 2005-05-18 2008-07-01 The Western Union Company In-lane money transfer systems and methods
US8672220B2 (en) 2005-09-30 2014-03-18 The Western Union Company Money transfer system and method
US20070138267A1 (en) * 2005-12-21 2007-06-21 Singer-Harter Debra L Public terminal-based translator
US7891561B2 (en) * 2006-02-16 2011-02-22 First Data Corporation Cash redemption of gift cards systems and methods
US7669758B2 (en) 2006-04-04 2010-03-02 American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. Obtaining transaction accounts using identification cards
CN101627574A (en) * 2006-11-14 2010-01-13 Sgl网络公司 The system and method that is used for the transaction vetting service
US8818904B2 (en) 2007-01-17 2014-08-26 The Western Union Company Generation systems and methods for transaction identifiers having biometric keys associated therewith
US7933835B2 (en) 2007-01-17 2011-04-26 The Western Union Company Secure money transfer systems and methods using biometric keys associated therewith
US8504473B2 (en) 2007-03-28 2013-08-06 The Western Union Company Money transfer system and messaging system
US20080243705A1 (en) * 2007-03-28 2008-10-02 The Western Union Company Third-Party Gift Registry And Payment System
US7783571B2 (en) 2007-05-31 2010-08-24 First Data Corporation ATM system for receiving cash deposits from non-networked clients
US7620596B2 (en) 2007-06-01 2009-11-17 The Western Union Company Systems and methods for evaluating financial transaction risk
US8504450B2 (en) * 2007-08-31 2013-08-06 Ebay Inc. Mobile remittances/payments
US8694424B2 (en) 2007-12-18 2014-04-08 Federal Reserve Bank Of Atlanta System and method for managing foreign payments using separate messaging and settlement mechanisms
US20090281946A1 (en) 2008-05-12 2009-11-12 Davis Peter A ACH Payment Processing
US20090327143A1 (en) * 2008-06-27 2009-12-31 Fernando Morales Method and apparatus to send cash to any person in the world
US8489476B1 (en) 2008-06-30 2013-07-16 United States Automobile Association (USAA) Data manager for suspicious activity monitor
US20100169137A1 (en) * 2008-12-31 2010-07-01 Ebay Inc. Methods and systems to analyze data using a graph
US8473352B2 (en) * 2009-03-24 2013-06-25 The Western Union Company Consumer due diligence for money transfer systems and methods
WO2011000412A1 (en) * 2009-06-30 2011-01-06 Abn Amro Bank N.V Processing coded data
WO2011025689A1 (en) * 2009-08-25 2011-03-03 Bank Of America Corporation Integrated fraud platform
US9224146B2 (en) * 2009-09-30 2015-12-29 The Toronto Dominion Bank Apparatus and method for point of sale terminal fraud detection
US20110196790A1 (en) * 2010-02-05 2011-08-11 Milne Benjamin P Transaction processing system
US8510188B2 (en) * 2010-07-28 2013-08-13 The Western Union Company Receiver driven money transfer alert system
US10453122B2 (en) 2010-08-18 2019-10-22 The Western Union Company Systems and methods for assessing fraud risk
US8700510B2 (en) 2011-02-11 2014-04-15 Federal Reserve Bank Of Atlanta Redirecting or returning international credit transfers
US20120226579A1 (en) * 2011-03-01 2012-09-06 Ha Vida Fraud detection based on social data
US8924287B1 (en) * 2011-08-18 2014-12-30 Sprint Communications Company L.P. System and methods for mobile electronic funds transfers
US9014662B1 (en) 2012-06-25 2015-04-21 Sprint Communications Company L.P. Pre-paid phone cash wallet
US11574368B1 (en) 2014-10-06 2023-02-07 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company Risk mitigation for affinity groupings
US10664920B1 (en) * 2014-10-06 2020-05-26 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company Blockchain systems and methods for providing insurance coverage to affinity groups
US20210358045A1 (en) 2014-10-06 2021-11-18 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company Medical diagnostic-initiated insurance offering
US10616411B1 (en) 2017-08-21 2020-04-07 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. System and method for intelligent call interception and fraud detecting audio assistant
US20190122226A1 (en) * 2017-10-20 2019-04-25 International Business Machines Corporation Suspicious activity report smart validation
JP7070272B2 (en) * 2018-09-19 2022-05-18 富士通株式会社 Transaction management device, transaction management method and transaction management program
DK3629551T3 (en) * 2018-09-28 2022-10-03 Ipco 2012 Ltd APPARATUS, COMPUTER PROGRAM AND METHOD FOR REAL-TIME TRACKING OF TRANSACTIONS THROUGH A DISTRIBUTED NETWORK
US11102092B2 (en) * 2018-11-26 2021-08-24 Bank Of America Corporation Pattern-based examination and detection of malfeasance through dynamic graph network flow analysis
US11276064B2 (en) 2018-11-26 2022-03-15 Bank Of America Corporation Active malfeasance examination and detection based on dynamic graph network flow analysis
US20220012697A1 (en) * 2020-07-07 2022-01-13 Up N' Go Intermediary advanced payment processes

Citations (27)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US2003A (en) * 1841-03-12 Improvement in horizontal windivhlls
US5790645A (en) * 1996-08-01 1998-08-04 Nynex Science & Technology, Inc. Automatic design of fraud detection systems
US5892900A (en) * 1996-08-30 1999-04-06 Intertrust Technologies Corp. Systems and methods for secure transaction management and electronic rights protection
US5949044A (en) * 1997-06-13 1999-09-07 Walker Asset Management Limited Partnership Method and apparatus for funds and credit line transfers
US5963647A (en) * 1997-02-14 1999-10-05 Citicorp Development Center, Inc. Method and system for transferring funds from an account to an individual
US6095413A (en) * 1997-11-17 2000-08-01 Automated Transaction Corporation System and method for enhanced fraud detection in automated electronic credit card processing
US6205436B1 (en) * 1994-04-28 2001-03-20 Citibank, N.A. Trusted agents for open electronic commerce where the transfer of electronic merchandise or electronic money is provisional until the transaction is finalized
US6254000B1 (en) * 1998-11-13 2001-07-03 First Data Corporation System and method for providing a card transaction authorization fraud warning
US20020029190A1 (en) * 2000-01-05 2002-03-07 Uniteller Financial Services, Inc. Money-transfer techniques
US6424706B1 (en) * 1999-03-31 2002-07-23 Imagine Networks, Llc Method and system for transferring telecommunication-time units among accounts and exchanging same for goods or services
US20020138417A1 (en) * 2001-03-20 2002-09-26 David Lawrence Risk management clearinghouse
US6487542B2 (en) * 1997-08-14 2002-11-26 Hitachi, Ltd. Method and apparatus for managing electronic money and storage for storing an electronic money management program
US20030033228A1 (en) * 2000-11-30 2003-02-13 Rowan Bosworth-Davies Countermeasures for irregularities in financial transactions
US6526389B1 (en) * 1999-04-20 2003-02-25 Amdocs Software Systems Limited Telecommunications system for generating a three-level customer behavior profile and for detecting deviation from the profile to identify fraud
US20030074310A1 (en) * 2001-10-15 2003-04-17 Felix Grovit Computerized money transfer system and method
US6567814B1 (en) * 1998-08-26 2003-05-20 Thinkanalytics Ltd Method and apparatus for knowledge discovery in databases
US20030105711A1 (en) * 2001-11-30 2003-06-05 International Business Machines Corporation Authorizing financial transactions
US6651055B1 (en) * 2001-03-01 2003-11-18 Lawson Software, Inc. OLAP query generation engine
US6678666B1 (en) * 2000-06-05 2004-01-13 Van W. Boulware Method of conducting anti-fraud electronic bank security transactions having price-date-time variables and calculating apparatus thereof
US6736314B2 (en) * 2000-06-09 2004-05-18 Telecom Usa Methods and systems for transferring funds
US20040117316A1 (en) * 2002-09-13 2004-06-17 Gillum Alben Joseph Method for detecting suspicious transactions
US6917940B1 (en) * 2000-03-10 2005-07-12 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Olap-based customer behavior profiling method and system
US7313545B2 (en) * 2001-09-07 2007-12-25 First Data Corporation System and method for detecting fraudulent calls
US7433855B2 (en) * 1995-04-21 2008-10-07 Mci Communications Corporation System and method for detecting and managing fraud
US7590658B2 (en) * 2004-09-30 2009-09-15 Deloitte Development Llc System, software and method for examining a database in a forensic accounting environment
US7631005B2 (en) * 2005-03-15 2009-12-08 Hyperion Solutions Corporation Multidimensional data visualization using four or more dimensions
US8412633B2 (en) * 2002-03-04 2013-04-02 The Western Union Company Money transfer evaluation systems and methods

Family Cites Families (11)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US50880A (en) * 1865-11-07 Improvement in pitman-connections for harvesters
US4317957A (en) * 1980-03-10 1982-03-02 Marvin Sendrow System for authenticating users and devices in on-line transaction networks
JPH02500113A (en) * 1987-07-10 1990-01-18 クウォンタム ケミカル コーポレイション Propylene polymerization catalyst and method
US5761650A (en) * 1995-12-29 1998-06-02 Csg Systems, Inc. Billing system and method
GB9606792D0 (en) * 1996-03-29 1996-06-05 British Telecomm A telecommunications network
US6208720B1 (en) * 1998-04-23 2001-03-27 Mci Communications Corporation System, method and computer program product for a dynamic rules-based threshold engine
US6373932B2 (en) * 1999-05-03 2002-04-16 Hewlett-Packard Company Configuration tracking system
US6418436B1 (en) * 1999-12-20 2002-07-09 First Data Corporation Scoring methodology for purchasing card fraud detection
US6516056B1 (en) * 2000-01-07 2003-02-04 Vesta Corporation Fraud prevention system and method
US7386510B2 (en) * 2001-09-07 2008-06-10 First Data Corporation System and method for detecting fraudulent calls
US20030135457A1 (en) * 2002-09-06 2003-07-17 Stewart Whitney Hilton Method and apparatus for providing online financial account services

Patent Citations (27)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US2003A (en) * 1841-03-12 Improvement in horizontal windivhlls
US6205436B1 (en) * 1994-04-28 2001-03-20 Citibank, N.A. Trusted agents for open electronic commerce where the transfer of electronic merchandise or electronic money is provisional until the transaction is finalized
US7433855B2 (en) * 1995-04-21 2008-10-07 Mci Communications Corporation System and method for detecting and managing fraud
US5790645A (en) * 1996-08-01 1998-08-04 Nynex Science & Technology, Inc. Automatic design of fraud detection systems
US5892900A (en) * 1996-08-30 1999-04-06 Intertrust Technologies Corp. Systems and methods for secure transaction management and electronic rights protection
US5963647A (en) * 1997-02-14 1999-10-05 Citicorp Development Center, Inc. Method and system for transferring funds from an account to an individual
US5949044A (en) * 1997-06-13 1999-09-07 Walker Asset Management Limited Partnership Method and apparatus for funds and credit line transfers
US6487542B2 (en) * 1997-08-14 2002-11-26 Hitachi, Ltd. Method and apparatus for managing electronic money and storage for storing an electronic money management program
US6095413A (en) * 1997-11-17 2000-08-01 Automated Transaction Corporation System and method for enhanced fraud detection in automated electronic credit card processing
US6567814B1 (en) * 1998-08-26 2003-05-20 Thinkanalytics Ltd Method and apparatus for knowledge discovery in databases
US6254000B1 (en) * 1998-11-13 2001-07-03 First Data Corporation System and method for providing a card transaction authorization fraud warning
US6424706B1 (en) * 1999-03-31 2002-07-23 Imagine Networks, Llc Method and system for transferring telecommunication-time units among accounts and exchanging same for goods or services
US6526389B1 (en) * 1999-04-20 2003-02-25 Amdocs Software Systems Limited Telecommunications system for generating a three-level customer behavior profile and for detecting deviation from the profile to identify fraud
US20020029190A1 (en) * 2000-01-05 2002-03-07 Uniteller Financial Services, Inc. Money-transfer techniques
US6917940B1 (en) * 2000-03-10 2005-07-12 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Olap-based customer behavior profiling method and system
US6678666B1 (en) * 2000-06-05 2004-01-13 Van W. Boulware Method of conducting anti-fraud electronic bank security transactions having price-date-time variables and calculating apparatus thereof
US6736314B2 (en) * 2000-06-09 2004-05-18 Telecom Usa Methods and systems for transferring funds
US20030033228A1 (en) * 2000-11-30 2003-02-13 Rowan Bosworth-Davies Countermeasures for irregularities in financial transactions
US6651055B1 (en) * 2001-03-01 2003-11-18 Lawson Software, Inc. OLAP query generation engine
US20020138417A1 (en) * 2001-03-20 2002-09-26 David Lawrence Risk management clearinghouse
US7313545B2 (en) * 2001-09-07 2007-12-25 First Data Corporation System and method for detecting fraudulent calls
US20030074310A1 (en) * 2001-10-15 2003-04-17 Felix Grovit Computerized money transfer system and method
US20030105711A1 (en) * 2001-11-30 2003-06-05 International Business Machines Corporation Authorizing financial transactions
US8412633B2 (en) * 2002-03-04 2013-04-02 The Western Union Company Money transfer evaluation systems and methods
US20040117316A1 (en) * 2002-09-13 2004-06-17 Gillum Alben Joseph Method for detecting suspicious transactions
US7590658B2 (en) * 2004-09-30 2009-09-15 Deloitte Development Llc System, software and method for examining a database in a forensic accounting environment
US7631005B2 (en) * 2005-03-15 2009-12-08 Hyperion Solutions Corporation Multidimensional data visualization using four or more dimensions

Cited By (23)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20140075508A1 (en) * 2007-06-22 2014-03-13 4Dk Technologies, Inc. Delegating or transferring of access to resources between multiple devices
US9059995B2 (en) * 2007-06-22 2015-06-16 Radius Networks Inc. Delegating or transferring of access to resources between multiple devices
US20130325720A1 (en) * 2007-10-18 2013-12-05 Moneygram International, Inc. Global compliance processing system for a money transfer system
WO2009114020A1 (en) * 2008-03-14 2009-09-17 Sgl Network, Inc. Systems and methods for biometric authentication of monetary fund transfer
US20090234764A1 (en) * 2008-03-14 2009-09-17 Mark Friesen Systems and methods for biometric authentication of monetary fund transfer
US20090287599A1 (en) * 2008-05-15 2009-11-19 Bank Of America Corporation Monetary Transfer Approval Via Mobile Device
US8600881B2 (en) * 2008-11-13 2013-12-03 Visa International Service Association System and method for uniquely identifying point of sale devices in an open payment network
US20100121701A1 (en) * 2008-11-13 2010-05-13 Loc Duc Nguyen System and method for uniquely identifying point of sale devices in an open payment network
US10402795B2 (en) 2012-01-05 2019-09-03 Moneygram International, Inc. Prefunding for money transfer send transactions
US11687891B2 (en) 2012-01-05 2023-06-27 Moneygram International, Inc. Prefunding for money transfer send transactions
US20140244497A1 (en) * 2012-05-08 2014-08-28 Vantiv, Llc Systems and Methods for Performing Funds Freeze and/or Funds Seizure with Respect to Prepaid Payment Cards
US9710810B2 (en) * 2012-05-08 2017-07-18 Vantiv, Llc Systems and methods for performing funds freeze and/or funds seizure with respect to prepaid payment cards
US11836716B2 (en) 2012-05-08 2023-12-05 Worldpay, Llc Systems and methods for performing funds freeze and/or funds seizure with respect to prepaid payment cards
US10089622B2 (en) * 2012-05-08 2018-10-02 Worldpay, Llc Systems and methods for performing funds freeze and/or funds seizure with respect to prepaid payment cards
US20180374085A1 (en) * 2012-05-08 2018-12-27 Worldpay, Llc Systems and methods for performing funds freeze and/or funds seizure with respect to prepaid payment cards
US11397945B2 (en) 2012-05-08 2022-07-26 Worldpay, Llc Systems and methods for performing funds freeze and/or funds seizure with respect to prepaid payment cards
US9751006B2 (en) 2012-11-26 2017-09-05 Moneygram International, Inc. Promotion generation engine for a money transfer system
US10232268B2 (en) 2012-11-26 2019-03-19 Moneygram International, Inc. Promotion generation engine for a money transfer system
US9943761B2 (en) 2012-11-26 2018-04-17 Moneygram International, Inc. Promotion generation engine for a money transfer system
US10755245B2 (en) 2013-02-25 2020-08-25 Moneygram International, Inc. Money transfer system having location based language and dynamic receipt capabilities
US10909512B2 (en) 2013-08-01 2021-02-02 Moneygram International, Inc. System and method for staging money transfers between users having profiles
US10192204B2 (en) 2013-08-01 2019-01-29 Moneygram International, Inc. System and method for staging money transfers between users having profiles
US11900227B1 (en) 2022-07-25 2024-02-13 Gravystack, Inc. Apparatus for producing a financial target strategy and a method for its use

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US20130262297A1 (en) 2013-10-03
AU2003223235A1 (en) 2003-09-22
US20030220878A1 (en) 2003-11-27
WO2003077181A1 (en) 2003-09-18
US20030167237A1 (en) 2003-09-04
US8412633B2 (en) 2013-04-02
US8417600B2 (en) 2013-04-09

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US20070073617A1 (en) System and method for evaluation of money transfer patterns
US7620599B2 (en) System and method for detecting fraudulent calls
US9892465B2 (en) System and method for suspect entity detection and mitigation
US7620592B2 (en) Tiered processing method and system for identifying and mitigating merchant risk
CA2615683C (en) Identification and risk evaluation
US10565592B2 (en) Risk analysis of money transfer transactions
US8463702B2 (en) Global compliance processing system for a money transfer system
US6535728B1 (en) Event manager for use in fraud detection
US10127554B2 (en) Fraud early warning system and method
US6757664B1 (en) Method and system for verification of checks at a point of sale
US20030009418A1 (en) Systems and methods for electronically verifying and processing information
US20020138417A1 (en) Risk management clearinghouse
US20100005013A1 (en) Methods and systems for detecting fraudulent transactions in a customer-not-present environment
US20170098280A1 (en) Systems and methods for detecting fraud in subscriber enrollment
EP1710763A1 (en) System and method for authorizing electronic payment transactions
KR20110035556A (en) Service system and service method for offering financial information using message oriented service
CN115641199A (en) Information auditing system and method
CN117522560A (en) Method for identifying non-compliance and non-place transaction of credit card
CN116703155A (en) Risk identification method, risk identification equipment and computer readable storage medium
EP1427244A2 (en) Event manager for use in fraud detection

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AS Assignment

Owner name: THE WESTERN UNION COMPANY, COLORADO

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:TOLBERT, SETH;BRANDT, NOEL;BULKLEY, ROBERT A.;AND OTHERS;REEL/FRAME:019021/0102;SIGNING DATES FROM 20061122 TO 20061128

STCB Information on status: application discontinuation

Free format text: ABANDONED -- AFTER EXAMINER'S ANSWER OR BOARD OF APPEALS DECISION